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Abstract: 
The optimal contest architecture for symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests is 
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number of contestants, the two-stage tournament is either strictly better or at least as good as the 
one-stage contest for maximizing an individual’s effort, for maximizing the aggregate effort and 
for minimizing the standard deviation of effort. For maximizing an individual’s effort it is 
generally optimal to have only two finalists in the second stage. For maximizing the aggregate 
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stage depends on the discriminating power of the contest success function.    
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Why qualifications at the Olympics?  
1. Introduction 
A contest is a competition where the contestants simultaneously contribute effort to win a 
prize. In perfectly discriminating contests (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela 2001) the highest 
contributed effort secures a win (like in an all-pay auction). In imperfectly discriminating 
contests (e.g. Dixit 1987) the highest contributed effort has the highest probability of a win but it 
does not necessarily secure a win. Imperfectly discriminating contests are extensively used to 
study sport competitions (e.g. Szymanski 2003), political rent-seeking (e.g. Nitzan 1991, 1994), 
research and development and patent races (e.g. Nti 1997), labor incentives (e.g. Rosen 1986) etc.  
In this paper I study the architecture of symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests. 
Casual evidence suggests that the one-stage contest is rarely organized (e.g. Amegashie 1999). 
Common practice instead is a two-stage tournament. In the first stage the contestants are grouped 
into several divisions where they compete for the right to participate in the second stage. In the 
second stage the contestants who won the first stage compete for the final prize. I will examine 
whether such a two-stage tournament is beneficial for the organizers who wish to maximize an 
individual’s effort, to maximize the aggregate effort or to minimize the standard deviation of 
contributed effort. This paper is related to Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Amegashie (1999) 
who studied the optimal architecture of symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests when the 
organizers want to maximize or minimize the aggregate (rent-seeking) effort. Moldovanu and 
Sela (2004) analyzed the optimal architecture of asymmetric perfectly discriminating contests. 
However, all above mentioned papers considered only a symmetric Nash equilibrium. In this 
paper I analyze the complete structure of equilibria including asymmetric equilibria (e.g. Perez-
Castrillo and Verdier 1992). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The one-stage contest (so called 
Tullock (1980) contest) is described in section two. The two-stage tournament is described in 
section three. These two contest architectures are examined in section four according to three 
criteria: maximum individual effort, maximum aggregate effort and minimum standard deviation 
of effort. Section five concludes. 
2. One-stage contest 
Consider 2≥n  identical contestants for a prize 0>V . Each contestant contributes an 
effort 0≥ie , [ ]ni ,1∈ , and has a probability ( ) ∑==
n
j
r
j
r
ii eeep
1
 of winning the prize.1 The logit 
form of the contest success function :p ú [ ]1,0→+  was introduced by Tullock (1980) and 
subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). 0>r  is the 
discriminating power of the contest success function. When +∞→r  the imperfectly 
discriminating contest converges to the perfectly discriminating one. In the standard Tullock 
(1980) contest the contestants are assumed to be risk neutral with linear cost of effort.  Kai and 
Schlesinger (1997) studied imperfectly discriminating contests with risk averse contestants and 
found that risk aversion has an indeterminate effect on the contributed effort. Moldovanu and 
Sela (2004) studied perfectly discriminating contests with convex cost of effort and found that the 
benefits of two-stage tournaments increase in the degree of convexity of a cost function. 
Each contestant maximizes the net expected value of his or her contributed effort (1). 
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1 The technology that translates an individual’s effort into the probability of winning is called the contest success 
function (e.g. Szymanski 2003). 
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The solution of problem (1) is presented in the second column of table 1 (e.g. Blavatskyy 2004, 
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992). Depending on its discriminating power the one-stage contest 
may have a symmetric Nash equilibium (the second row of table 1), an asymmetric Nash 
equilibrium (the third row of table 1) or a Stackelberg equilibrium (the fourth row of table 1). 
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) and Cleeton (1989) discussed the asymmetric Nash equilibria 
in the Tullock (1980) contest. Baye and Shin (1999) and Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) 
analyzed the Stackelberg equilibrium in the Tullock (1980) contest. 
The intuitive explanation of equilibrium structure from table 1 is as follows. In poorly 
discriminating contests (when ( )1−≤ nnr ) all contestants actively participate in the contest (i.e. 
they contribute positive effort) because there is a possibility to win a prize (almost by chance) 
while contributing low effort. In moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn ) up 
to 2−n  contestants may drop out of competition. They become passive contestants who 
contribute zero effort. The remaining active contestants are expected to contribute such a high 
effort that it erases any expectations of winning a prize for the passive contestants. In highly 
discriminating contests (when 2>r ) only one contestant is active and 1−n  contestants are 
passive.  
Discriminating 
power of the contest 
success function 
Individual effort Aggregate effort Standard deviation 
of effort 
1
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r
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−
Table 1 An individual’s effort, the aggregate effort and the standard deviation of effort in 
one-stage contest with n contestants for a single prize V 
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3. Two-stage tournament 
In the first stage of the tournament n contestants are grouped into [ ]2,2 nf ∈  divisions 
with fn  contestants in each division. A separate contest is then organized in each division for 
the right to participate in the second stage. A contestant who won the first-stage contest proceeds 
to the second stage. All other contestants are eliminated from further competition. In the second 
stage f contestants (each of whom has won the first-stage contest) compete for the prize V. The 
second stage is thus equivalent to the one-stage contest described in section 2 with fn = .  
Let [ ]fk ,1∈  be the number of active contestants in the second-stage contest each of 
whom contributes an effort ke . For each contestant who actively (passively) participates in the 
second stage, the net expected value of his or her contributed effort is kekV −  (zero). Since 
there are k active contestants and kf −  passive contestants, the net expected value of the 
participation in the second stage is ex ante equal to ( ) ( ) fkeVfekVkV kk −=−=1 . Therefore, 
the right for participation in the second stage yields an ex ante payoff 1V . The first-stage 
divisional contest is then equivalent to the one-stage contest described in section two with fn  
contestants and a prize 1V  (e.g. Amegashie 1999). 
4. Comparative statics 
The contests’ organizers (here onwards the organizers) may have three different 
objectives: to maximize an individual’s effort, to maximize the aggregate effort, or to minimize 
the standard deviation of the contestants’ effort. In other words, the organizers may wish to 
observe the highest winning effort (the breaking of a world record), to maintain the overall 
quality of the contest, or to foster a close contest (a competitive balance) resulting in a thrilling 
competition (e.g. Szymanski 2003, p. 1143).  
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4.1. Maximum individual effort 
Suppose that the organizers want to maximize an individual’s effort contributed in the 
two-stage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when ( )1−≤ nnr ) all contestants 
actively participate in the first stage and all short-listed contestants actively participate in the 
second stage ( fk = ). Consequently, the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in both stages. In the 
second stage each contestant contributes effort ( ) 21 ffrVe f −= , which follows from the 
second row of table 1. In the first stage each contestant contributes effort 
( ) 22 1
1
n
fn
f
rrrV
fn
fne
f
Vr f
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − . An individual’s effort contributed in the first (second) 
stage is decreasing in f (as long as 2≥f ). Thus, in order to maximize an individual’s effort 
contributed in the two-stage tournament the organizers should minimize the number of 
participants in the second stage. The optimal architecture is to set 2=f  i.e. when the contestants 
are divided into two parallel sub-contests in the first stage and only two contestants compete for 
the final prize in the second stage. 
In moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn ) some contestants may 
optimally drop out of competition either in the first or in the second stage of the two-stage 
tournament. Thus, the contest may end up in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (e.g. the third row 
of table 1). The maximum number of active contestants in the first (second) stage is 
endogenously determined by the discriminating power of the contest success function and it is 
equal to ( ){ }1int −rr  (e.g. Perez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992). The problem of the organizers who 
wish to maximize an individual’s effort is then given by equation (2).2 
                                                 
2 The control variable f of the contests’ organizers is drawn from the interval [ ]n,2 . This enables a convenient 
comparison between the one-stage contest and the two-stage tournament within one optimization problem. When the 
solution of (2) is nf =  ( [ ]nf ,2∈ ) the one-stage contest (two-stage tournament) is optimal. 
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In poorly discriminating contests (when ( )1−≤ nnr ) the number of active contestants in 
the first (second) stage fnl =  ( fk = ) was exogenously determined by the organizers. In 
moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn ) the asymmetric Nash equilibria may 
arise endogenously in the two-stage tournament. The organizers face an additional constraint—
they cannot assign more active contestants to a single stage of the tournament than the 
endogenous limit of ( ){ }1int −rr . This constraint is formalized in the second line of equation (2). 
The unique solution of problem (2) is 2=f  which coincides with the optimal architecture under 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, the endogenous constraint on the maximum number 
of active contestants is not binding for the organizers who would always prefer to have a 
minimum number of active contestants in the second stage. 
In highly discriminating contests (when 2>r ) a Stackelberg equilibrium endogenously 
emerges in competition (e.g. Blavatskyy 2004). In the two-stage tournament only one contestant 
actively participates in the second stage and he or she contributes an effort ( ) rrVe r111 1 −−=  
(e.g. the fourth row of table 1). This effort does not depend on the contest architecture (the 
number f of the short-listed contestants). In the first stage also only one contestant actively 
participates in each divisional contest. He or she contributes an effort ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
r
r
f
V r1111  which is 
always smaller than the effort 1e  contributed in the second stage. Therefore, when 2>r  the 
organizers have no control over maximum individual’s effort contributed in the contest. Any 
contest architecture (either the one-stage contest or the two-stage tournament) would yield the 
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same maximum individual’s effort. The optimal contest architecture for maximizing an 
individual’s effort (depending on the discriminating power of the contest success function) is 
summarized in the second column of table 2. 
4.2. Maximum aggregate effort 
Suppose that the organizers want to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the two-
stage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when ( )1−≤ nnr ) the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium exists in both stages. We already established that in the second stage f contestants 
then contribute effort ( ) 21 ffrVe f −=  each. In the first stage n contestants contribute effort 
21 n
fn
f
rrrV −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−  each. The problem of the organizers who want to maximize an aggregate 
effort is then given by equation (3).  
[ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−
∈ n
fn
f
rrrV
f
frV
nf
11max
,2
 (3) 
The straightforward maximization of problem (3) yields a solution nf =  when 1<r  
and nf =  when 1>r . In a special case when 1=r  the aggregate effort contributed in the 
contest does not depend on the contest architecture (e.g. Gradstein and Konrad 1999). Intuitively, 
when the number f of the contestants who participate in the second stage increases, the aggregate 
effort contributed in the second stage increases but the aggregate effort contributed in the first 
stage decreases. When the contest is almost undiscriminating ( 1<r ) these two effects can be 
optimally balanced if the number of finalists is nf = .3 When the contest is sufficiently 
discriminating ( 1>r ) there is no interior solution. The aggregate effort is actually minimal when 
                                                 
3 Gradstein and Konrad (1999) demonstrated that when 1<r  the optimal architecture is a knock-out tournament (a 
series of pairwise contests). In other words, the optimal number of contestants in each stage should be minimum 
(two) and the number of stages should be maximum ( { } 1logint 2 +n ). This paper, however, considers only the 
two-stage tournament. Because of this restriction the optimal number of contestants in each stage is nf = . 
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nf =  (e.g. Amegashie 1999). The aggregate effort can be maximized only when the number of 
finalists is either minimal ( 2=f ) or maximal ( nf = ). And it turns out that in this case the 
aggregate effort is maximized when nf =  i.e. when the two-stage tournament collapses to the 
one-stage contest (e.g. Gradstein and Konrad 1999).  
In moderately discriminating contests (when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn ) the organizers do not have 
full control over the number of active contestants in each stage due to the endogenous entry-exit 
in the asymmetric Nash equilibria. The maximum number of active contestants in each stage is 
endogenously restricted to be ( ){ }1int −rr . The problem of the aggregate effort maximization 
becomes (4). 
[ ]
( ){ }{ } ( ){ }{ }1int,min,1int,min
,111max
,2
−=−=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−
∈
rrfnlrrfk
l
l
k
rrrV
k
krV
nf   (4) 
The solution of problem (4) is presented in appendix I. When ( )1−≤ nnr  the optimal 
architecture is the two-stage tournament with ( ){ }1int −= rrf . When ( )1−≥ nnr  the 
optimal architecture is any two two-stage tournament with 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
≤≤⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
1
int1
int
r
r
nf
r
r .  
Intuitively, the organizers who maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the contest 
would like to have as many active contestants in the second stage as possible. However, if the 
number f of the contestants who have the right to participate in the second stage exceeds 
( ){ }1int −rr , some of them optimally choose to withdraw from competition in the second stage. 
Although such contestants are promoted to the second stage they contribute nothing to the 
aggregate effort in the second stage. From the point of view of aggregate efficiency too many 
contestants are promoted to the second stage: some of them should have been eliminated in the 
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first stage. Therefore, the optimal architecture that maximizes the aggregate effort is the two-
stage tournament. The number of finalists in the second stage ( ){ }1int −= rrf  is such that if one 
more contestant is allowed to participate in the second stage he or she would optimally not use 
this right (by contributing zero effort in the second stage).  
Finally, if the discriminating power of the contest success function is sufficiently high 
( ( )1−≥ nnr ) the optimal contest architecture is not unique. The intuition is the following: 
when too many contestants are admitted to the second stage they contribute nothing to the 
aggregate effort in the second stage. However, if they participate only in the first stage they also 
optimally withdraw from the competition. Therefore, the precise regulation of the number of 
finalists in the second stage may not affect the aggregate effort contributed in the contest. Several 
contest architectures may yield the same aggregate effort. 
As we have already established, in highly discriminating contests (when 2>r ) only one 
contestant actively participates in the second stage of the two-stage tournament. He or she 
contributes effort ( ) rrVe r111 1 −−=  (e.g. the fourth row of table 1). In the first stage also only 
one contestant actively participates in each of f divisional contests. He or she contributes effort 
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
r
r
f
V r1111 . The aggregate effort contributed in the tournament is then V. The value of the 
prize is perfectly dissipated over the contributed aggregate effort. Any two-stage tournament 
would be the optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort (the precise number of 
divisions is insignificant). The optimal contest architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort 
(depending on the discriminating power of the contest success function) is summarized in the 
third column of table 2. 
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4.3. Minimum standard deviation of effort 
Suppose that the organizers want to minimize the standard deviation of effort contributed 
in the two-stage tournament. In poorly discriminating contests (when ( )1−≤ nnr ) the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in both stages. In each stage every participating contestant 
contributes the same effort as the others. The standard deviation of contributed effort is zero (at 
its minimum). Therefore, any contest architecture yields minimum standard deviation of effort.  
If the one-stage contest is organized when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn  some contestants optimally 
withdraw from competition. In such asymmetric Nash equilibrium the standard deviation of 
effort is non-zero. The organizers can reduce the dispersion of effort by switching to the two-
stage tournament. If the number f of the contestants who have the right to participate in the 
second stage is less than ( ){ }1int −rr , all short-listed contestants actively participate in the 
second stage contest. The standard deviation of effort in the second stage is then zero. 
Additionally, if the number fn  of the contestants who participate in the first-stage divisional 
contest is less than ( ){ }1int −rr , the standard deviation of effort in the first stage is then zero as 
well. Therefore, any two-stage tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤≤⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
− 1int1int r
rf
r
rn  minimizes the 
standard deviation of contributed effort. Such a tournament is feasible when ( ){ }1int −≤ rrn , 
which implies a restriction on the discriminating power of the contest success function 
( )1−≤ nnr . 
When ( )1−> nnr  there is no two-stage tournament that can reduce the standard 
deviation of effort to zero in both stages. In the second stage the standard deviation of effort is 
fkk
krV 111 −−   (e.g. third row of table 1), where ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int,min r
rfk  is the number of 
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active participants in the second stage. The standard deviation of effort contributed in the second 
stage strictly increases with f and falls to zero when ( ){ }1int −≤ rrf . In the first stage the 
standard deviation of effort is 
n
f
ll
l
k
rr
f
Vr −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− 111 , where ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int,min r
r
f
nl  is the 
number of active participants in the first stage. The standard deviation of effort contributed in the 
first stage strictly decreases with f and falls to zero when ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥ 1int r
rnf . Therefore, the one-
stage contest can never be optimal—any two-stage tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥ 1int r
rnf  has a 
lower standard deviation of effort in the second stage and zero standard deviation of effort in the 
first stage.  
More generally, any two-stage tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−< 1int r
rf  ( ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−> 1int r
rnf ) is 
correspondingly dominated by the two-stage tournament with ( ){ }1int −= rrf  
( ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rnf ). Additionally, the tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  has a lower standard 
deviation of effort in the first stage than the standard deviation of effort in the second stage of the 
tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rnf  (both tournaments have zero standard deviation of effort 
correspondingly in the second and in the first stage). Finally, it turns out that the tournament with 
( ){ }1int −= rrf  is optimal because any tournament with higher f causes an increase in the 
standard deviation of effort contributed in the second stage, which is larger than overall standard 
deviation of effort contributed in the first stage (see proof in appendix II).  
Intuitively, in the first stage the contestants compete for the expectation to win a prize in 
the second stage. Thus, the contributed effort and its standard deviation is much lower in the first 
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stage than in the second stage, because in the second stage the contestants compete for an actual 
prize. Therefore, the cost of increasing the dispersion of effort in the second stage is much higher 
than in the first stage. Thus, the optimal contest architecture minimizes the standard deviation of 
effort in the second stage. The number of finalists ( ){ }1int −= rrf  is such that if one more 
contestant is allowed to participate in the second stage he or she would optimally not use this 
right. 
When 2>r  there is always only one contestant who actively participates in the contest. 
There is no two-stage tournament that can reduce the standard deviation of effort to zero in either 
stage. The standard deviation of effort contributed in the second stage is ( ) f
r
rV
r
111
11
−−
−
 
(e.g. the fourth row of table 1). It strictly increases in f and reaches it’s minimum when 2=f .  
The standard deviation of effort contributed in the first stage is ( ) nf
r
r
f
V r −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
111
11
. It 
strictly decreases in f and reaches its minimum in the one-stage contest (when nf =  and the first 
stage is omitted). The standard deviation of effort contributed in the first (second) stage of the 
two-stage tournament with 2=f  is ( )
nr
rV r 2111
2
11
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
 ( ( )
2
1 11
r
rV
r−− ) and it is lower than 
the standard deviation of effort contributed in the one-stage contest: ( ) n
r
rV
r
111
11
−−
−
. 
Therefore, the optimal architecture is the two-stage tournament with 2=f . The optimal contest 
architecture for minimizing the standard deviation of effort (depending on the discriminating 
power of the contest success function) is summarized in the fourth column of table 2. 
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Objective  
of the organizers 
Discriminating  
power r of the contest  
success function 
Maximum 
individual 
effort 
Maximum aggregate 
effort 
Minimum standard 
deviation of effort 
10 << r  Two-stage tournament 
nf =  
1=r  Any 
1
1 −≤< n
nr  One-stage contest nf =  
Any 
11 −≤<− n
nr
n
n  
Two-stage tournament 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  
Two-stage tournament 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤≤
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
1
int
1
int r
rf
r
r
n
2
1
≤≤− rn
n  
Two-stage 
tournament
2=f  
Two-stage tournament 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
≤≤⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
1
int1
int
r
r
nf
r
r
Two-stage tournament 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  
2>r  Any Any two-stage 
tournament 
Two-stage tournament 
2=f  
Table 2 The optimal architecture of imperfectly discriminating contests with n contestants 
(in the two-stage tournament f short-listed contestants compete in the second stage) 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper explains an empirical observation that the one-stage contests are rarely 
organized in real life. The majority of real life competitions are organized instead as the two-
stage tournaments. In the first stage the contestants compete in several parallel contests for the 
right to participate in the second stage. In the second stage the short-listed contestants compete 
for the final prize. For example, at the Olympics there is typically a qualification stage and a final 
stage. One can think of other examples of multi-stage contests, such as job interviews, political 
elections etc. 
The main theoretical result of this paper is the following. In symmetric imperfectly 
discriminating contests the optimal contest architecture is generically the two-stage tournament. 
Given a sufficient number of contestants, the two-stage tournament is either strictly better or at 
least as good as the one-stage contest for maximizing an individual’s effort, for maximizing the 
aggregate effort and for minimizing the standard deviation of effort. Only on one instance when 
the discriminating power r of the contest success function is between unity and ( )1−nn  the one-
stage contest is an optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort. However, when the 
number of contestants is very large the probability that ( )( ]1,1 −∈ nnr  converges to zero. 
When the organizers want to maximize an individual’s effort the optimal architecture is 
generically the two-stage tournament with only two contestants in the second stage. Moldovanu 
and Sela (2004) obtained the same result for perfectly discriminating contests. When the 
organizers want to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the contest or to minimize the 
standard deviation of effort, the optimal number of finalists in the second stage depends on the 
discriminating power of the contest success function. In moderately discriminating contests 
(when ( ) 21 ≤<− rnn ) the optimal architecture for maximizing the aggregate effort (minimizing 
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the standard deviation of effort) is generically the following. The two-stage tournament should be 
organized with such a number of finalists in the second stage that if one more contestant is 
allowed to participate in the second stage he or she would optimally not use this right.  
Interestingly, in highly discriminating contests (when 2>r ) the optimal architecture for 
maximizing the aggregate effort is any two-stage tournament. It does not matter how many 
finalists are admitted to the second stage. Only the fact that there are two stages in the tournament 
is sufficient to maximize the aggregate effort contributed in the competition. This result contrasts 
with the finding in Moldovanu and Sela (2004) that the one-stage contest is optimal for 
maximizing the aggregate effort in perfectly discriminating contests (that may be thought of as a 
limiting case of highly discriminating contests). 
In this paper the analysis was restricted to the tournament that has only two stages, which 
is common in the literature on contest architecture (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela 2004, Amegashie 
1999). A natural extension of this work is to make the number of stages in the tournament a 
policy variable for the organizers. It would be interesting to explore under which conditions the 
multi-stage tournaments are preferred to the two-stage tournament and the one-stage contest. In 
the two-stage tournament, as modeled in this paper, only one contestant was promoted from each 
first stage division to the second stage. However, in many real life competitions several top 
ranked contestants are promoted from each sub-division to the next stage. It would be interesting 
to explore if the promotion of several top ranked contestants is optimal. 
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Appendix I 
The solution of the aggregate effort maximization problem (4).  
Three cases are possible. 
a) When ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥ 1int r
rf  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤ 1int r
r
f
n  problem (4) simplifies into (A1). 
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The objective function in (A1) is decreasing in f. Therefore, it is optimal to set f to its minimum 
possible value: ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf . Since case a) is possible only when ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤ 1int r
r
f
n , the solution 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  applies only when ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤ 1int r
rn . The last inequality implies a restriction on 
the discriminating power of the contest success function 
1−≤ n
nr . 
b) When ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≤ 1int r
rf  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥ 1int r
r
f
n  problem (4) simplifies into (A2). 
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The objective function in (A2) can be rearranged into (A3). 
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The objective function in (A3) is increasing in f. Therefore, it is optimal to set f to its maximum 
possible value: ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf . 
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−≥ 1int r
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f
n  problem (4) simplifies into (A4). 
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The objective function in (A4) does not depend on f. Therefore, any contest architecture yields 
the same aggregate effort. This case happens when ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥≥
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
1
int
1
int r
rf
r
r
n  which implies a 
restriction on the discriminating power of the contest success function 
1−≥ n
nr . 
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Appendix II 
Proof that the two-stage tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  is optimal for minimizing 
the standard deviation of effort when 2
1
≤≤− rn
n . We already know that the optimal 
architecture must be a two-stage tournament with 
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The standard deviation of effort contributed in the second stage is zero when 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf  and it strictly increases in f. When 1
1
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rf  it is already 
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. The last inequality holds because 
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r  when 2≤r . 
We demonstrated that 12 SS >  i.e. the minimum non-zero standard deviation of effort 
contributed in the second stage always exceeds the maximum possible standard deviation of 
effort contributed in the first stage. In other words there is no trade-off in this case. When f 
increases the standard deviation of effort contributed in the first (second) stage decreases 
(increases). However, any increase in the standard deviation of effort contributed in the second 
stage is always much higher than any decrease in the standard deviation of effort contributed in 
the first stage. Thus, the optimal architecture should set the standard deviation of effort 
contributed in the second stage to zero. In other words, the optimal architecture is the two-stage 
tournament with ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−= 1int r
rf . 
